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to require that the need to restrict speech be well-documented
and that the statutory restriction be precisely limited to addressing that need.
George W Scofield

WRONGFUL DEATH: PRESCRIPTION? PEREMPTION? CONFUSION!

Plaintiffs parents were murdered by an unknown assailant during an apparent robbery. It was more than two years
later before the identity of the alleged murderer was established when an inmate of the state penitentiary, who was free
on a weekend pass at the time of the crime, was indicted for
this offense. Plaintiff then sued the State Department of
Corrections for damages arising from the wrongful death of her
parents.' The First Circuit, reversing the trial court, held that
the one year period in which a wrongful death action must be
brought is not a period of peremption but rather is the one year
prescriptive period of article 3536 of the Civil Code,' which had
been suspended by the application of the doctrine of contranon
valentem.3 McClendon v. State Departmentof Corrections,357
So. 2d 1218 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).1
1. Plaintiff contended that the Department should be held (1) strictly liable or
(2) negligent for granting a furlough to a man with two prior homicides on his record.
Plaintiff also claimed damages for personal property allegedly stolen by the murderer.
2.
ages

"The following actions are . . . prescribed by one year: . . . [t]hat for damresulting from offenses or quasi offenses." LA. Crv. CoDE art. 3536.

. . .

3. Contra non valentem agere non curritprescriptio means no prescription runs
against a person unable to bring an action. Aegis Ins. Co. v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 99
So. 2d 767, 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
4. This note will not discuss the holding that the applicable time limitation for
an action for damages to the property of the deceased provided by article 2315 to the
deceased's legal heirs is the one year prescriptive period of article 3536. Though this is
apparently the first case in which the question arose, there was little doubt that the
time limitation for damages to the deceased's property was the prescriptive period of
article 3536. See Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana
Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 'LA. L. Rv. 1, 31 n.148 (1976).
Neither will this note discuss the general application of the doctrine of contra non
valentem in Louisiana. For the application of the doctrine in Louisiana, see generally
Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 139 La. 411, 71 So. 598 (1916); Dagenhart v.
Robertson Truck Lines, Inc., 230 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Note, Offenses
and Quasi-Offenses-Prescription-Contra
Non Valentem, 32 Tut. L. REv. 783 (1958).
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The history of the wrongful death action in Louisiana is a
storied one. At common law the death of a human being did
not give rise to a civil action for damages in favor of a living
person who was harmed by the death.5 However, in France such
an action was permitted under the Cour de cassation's interpretation of the Code Napoleon's basic tort article.' Louisiana
adopted this article verbatim as article 2294 in the Civil Code
of 1825.1 Nevertheless, in 1851 the Louisiana Supreme Court
refused to interpret the article as the French courts had, holding instead that sincethere was no statute specifically authorizing such an action, a wife could not recover for the wrongful
8
death of her husband.
In 1855 the legislature amended the article to read: "the
right of this action [i.e., the right to bring a tort action] shall
survive in cases of death.

. .

for the space of one year from the

death" in favor of certain named beneficiaries.' It is possible
that this amendment was a response to the supreme court's
decision that, absent an authorizing statute, no action for
wrongful death was available in Louisiana. 0 But regardless of
what may have been the legislature's intent, in 1865 the supreme court held that under the article as amended, only damages suffered by the victim of the tort survived to those named
5. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); Malone, The Genesis of
Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1965). For a discussion of the recovery
of damages at common law through a seldom used criminal action, see Voss, The
Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in
Louisiana, 6 TuL. L. REv. 201, 208-11 (1931). The principle that the death of a human
being did not give a civil action to a living person injured by the death was consistent
with Roman law, which likewise had not allowed such an action. Holdsworth, The
Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REv. 431, 436-37 (1916).
6. Voss, supra note 5, at 219.
7. Id. Article 2294 of the Civil Code of 1825 read: "Every act whatever of man,
that causes damage to another, obliges him, by whose fault it happened, to repair it."
8. Hubgh v. New Orleans and Carrollton R.R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1951). For a
criticism of the court's use of common law methodology and its disregard of French
jurisprudence interpreting the identical article from the Code Napoleon, see Voss,
supra note 5, at 219-20; King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366, 368-69 (La. 1975). In fact
the court in King said "Hubgh was in error." 316 So. 2d at 369.
9. 1855 La. Acts, No. 223.
10. See Earhart v. New Orleans and Carrollton R.R. Co., 17 La. Ann. 243, 245
(1865); Comment, Wrongful Death and Survival of Tort Actions in Louisiana, 1 Loy.
L. REv. 84, 85 (1941).
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in the article; the beneficiaries had no right to recover additional damages for their personal injuries sustained as a result
of the victim's death." In 1884 the legislature acted to remedy
the situation, amending what was by then article 2315 of the
1870 Civil Code 2 to provide for a wrongful death action by
adding the sentence: "The survivors above mentioned may also
recover the damages sustained by them by the death of the
parent or child, or husband or wife, as the case may be."'"
Significantly, this amendment adding the wrongful death
language to article 2315 was silent concerning the time limit
within which the action had to be exercised. 4 The prescriptive
11.
12.
1870.
13.
14.

Earhart v. New Orleans and Carrollton R.R. Co., 17 La. Ann. 243 (1865).
Article 2294 had become article 2315 with the revision of the Civil Code in

1884 La. Acts, No. 71.
In 1960 article 2315 was amended to read in pertinent part:
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.
The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi
offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his
legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse.
The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi-offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death
of the deceased . . . .The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives
may also recover the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death
of the deceased.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315, as amended by 1960 La. Acts, No. 30.
An argument can be made that this amendment tied the time period for wrongful
death to the time period for the survival action because the death action is granted to
those "in whose favor" the survival action survived. If an action has not been instituted
within the year period, then arguably there are no longer any survivors "in whose
favor" a survival action survived and thus none to whom the death action is granted.
Thus, arguably the wrongful death time is fixed by the statute granting the action and
is peremptive. See note 16, infra, and accompanying text.
However, this argument was apparently rejected in Callais v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 334 So. 2d 692 (La. 1976). There, on original hearing, the supreme court rejected
the argument that this same language creates only one cause of action. "The language
quoted above means no more than that named survivors upon whom devolve the right
to assert deceased's cause of action for his injuries are also the parties who may sue
for their own injuries resulting from the death." 334 So. 2d at 695. On rehearing the
court reversed its conclusion in the case; however, it did not repudiate this statement.
334 So. 2d at 699-701.
Though this sentence was addressed to a one-cause-of-action argument, the force
of it applies to an argument that the "in whose favor" language ties the wrongful death

1242

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

period for tort actions is one year; 5 the time limitation provided by the 1855 amendment granting the "survival" action
is also one year. In Louisiana, however, it has long been recognized that where a statute creates a right of action and stipulates the time in which it must be exercised, the period is one
of peremption, a time within which the right must be exercised
or the cause of action ceases to exist." Though both time limits
are one year periods, prescription is subject to interruption and
suspension, 7 while peremption is not.'8 Thus, the following
question is posed: Is the stipulation of time found in article
2315 applicable to both the survival" and wrongful death actions granted by the article, or does the general prescriptive
period for torts govern the wrongful death action?
and survival action together, thereby fixing the time in which a wrongful death action
can be brought. Since the language "means no more than" that the named survivors
can also sue for wrongful death, then the better argument is that the actions are tied
together insofar as the same beneficiaries may bring both actions, but no further. See
also Johnson, supra note 4, at 33-34.
The court's interpretation in Callais seems proper because the explicit purpose of
the 1960 amendment to article 2315 was "[tlo implement the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure." 1960 La. Acts, No. 30. The only substantive changes
in 2315 dealt with abatement and damages to personal property of the deceased. LA.
CODE CIv. P. art. 428, comment (d). The change in the language of article 2315 did
not otherwise evidence an intent to change its meaning. Johnson, supra note 4, at 30.
15.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 3536. See note 2, supra.

16. Guillory v. Avoyelles Railway Co., 104 La. 11, 28 So. 899 (1900), was the first
case in Louisiana which clearly articulated this notion. Though the language doing so
was dicta, the principle has become firmly ensconced in Louisiana law. Note,
Peremption-Prescription-Workmen's Compensation-Interruptionof Workmen's
Compensation Limitative Period by Filing Suit, 4 LA. L. REV. 624, 627-28, & 627 n.16
(1942). See, e.g., Ancor v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 260 La. 372, 256 So. 2d 122
(1971); Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953).
A pre-1900 case had recognized that where a grant of a right was coupled with the
condition that it be exercised within a specified time period, "the lapse of time thus
prescribed by law is more in the nature of a term of forfeiture than a term of prescription . . . . (The] right is destroyed by inaction during the prescribed time." Ashbey
v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 102, 110, 5 So. 539, 543 (1889).
17.

See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3516-27.

18. Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch, 364 So. 2d 928 (La. 1978); Succession of Pizzillo, 223
La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953); Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1971-1972 Term-Prescription,33 LA. L. REV. 235 (1973).

19. It is generally accepted that the time period for the survival action is peremptive because the statute granting the action fixes the time in which it must be invoked.
See, e.g., Gabriel v. United Theatres, 221 La. 219, 59 So. 2d 127 (1952), Romero v.
Sims, 68 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953). But see Johnson, supra note 4, at 36-41.
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This is a question that the jurisprudence has never adequately answered. The supreme court has called the period
prescriptive but has done so only in cases where the issue of
peremption was not considered. 0 However, the jurisprudence
and scholarship dealing with wrongful death contain unqualified expressions that the time period is one of peremption.'
The division on the question is clearly illustrated in state appellate court decisions. There is one line of cases treating the
period as peremptivel2 and another line of cases treating the
limitation as a prescriptive one. 2 A third group of cases has
20. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975); Stephenson v.
New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 165 La. 132, 115 So. 412 (1928); Vernon v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 154 La. 370, 97 So. 493 (1923); Rady v. Fire Ins. Patrol of New Orleans, 126
La. 273, 52 So. 491 (1910); Goodwin v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 109 La. 1050, 34 So. 74
(1902). Goodwin is sometimes cited for the proposition that the time period is peremptive, but the court held that the prescription of article 3536 runs against minors by
virtue of article 3541 of the Code. In dicta, the court said "the right of action itself is
conditioned upon its being exercised within a year from the time of death," citing
Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539 (1889), as one of the cases supporting
this proposition. 109 La. at 1066, 34 So. at 80. Thus, while treating the period as
prescriptive, there is language in dicta suggesting that the period might be peremptive.
Though the supreme court has never called the period peremptive, in Davis v.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 208 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
252 La. 175, 210 So. 2d 55 (1968), and Succession of Roux v. Guidry, 182 So. 2d 109
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 La. 1106, 184 So. 2d 27 (1966), the court in
refusing writs said there was "no error of law" in the Fourth Circuit judgments which
treated the period as peremptive.
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Monroe Grocery Co., 171 So. 167, 171 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1937), wherein it is stated that it is "well-settled doctrine that the delay provided...
is one of peremption." See also Comment, Survival of Actions in Article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code: The Victim's Action and the Wrongful Death Action, 43 TUL.
L. REv. 330, 344 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Davis v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 175, 210 So. 2d 55 (1968); Succession of Roux v. Guidry,
182 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 La. 1106, 184 So. 2d 27 (1966);
Smith v. Monroe Grocery Co., 171 So. 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937); Matthews v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (2d Cir. 1929).
23. However, in none of these cases was the question of peremption considered.
If the period had been treated as peremptive, the results would apparently have been
no different. Where prescription had not been interrupted, the peremptive period
would also have expired; those cases which found that prescription was interrupted by
the filing of suit apparently would have also found that a peremptive period had been
"interrupted." See text at notes 26-28, infra. See, e.g., Favors v. Southern Indus. Inc.,
344 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Hazel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d 431 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970); Myers v. Gulf Pub. Serv. Corp., 15 La. App. 589, 132 So. 416 (2d
Cir. 1931).
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avoided the issue by treating the two periods as functionally
indistinguishable for purposes of those decisions. Thus, they
have labelled the limitation a "prescriptive or peremptive period."24 On the other hand the federal courts have, with only
one exception, consistently treated the period as peremptive.2 5
Further confusing the matter is a group of cases holding
the wrongful death time limitation to be subject to interruption
or suspension by filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction despite either a suggestion or holding that the time period
is peremptive. Thus, when another suit was filed more than a
year after the death, it was held that the claim had not perempted.1 This result contradicts the rule that a period of per24. Wick v. Sellers, 309 So. 2d 909, 913 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Marshall v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 204 So. 2d 665, 667 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
251 La. 860, 206 So. 2d 711 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968). See also Cacibauda v. Gaienne, 305 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); note 26, infra, and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968); Kenney
v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966);
Thompson v. Gallien, 127 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 662 (1942).
The solitary exception treating the period as prescriptive is Brandon v. Kansas
City Southern Railway Co., 7 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1934), which did so because
Matthews v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (2d Cir.
1929), had said that filing suit in a competent court did not "interrupt" peremption.
However, in 1940 Matthews was expressly overruled by Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1940), a workman's compensation case which said that rules pertinent to interruption of prescription by filing suit were applicable to peremptive periods
also. 196 So. at 394-96.
See also Francis v. Herrin Transp. Co., 432 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1968), where the
Texas Supreme Court when called upon to apply Louisiana law treated the period as
peremptive, but subject to "interruption" by filing suit in a competent court. But see
notes 26-28, infra, and accompanying text.
26. Thompson v. Gallien, 127 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 662
(1942) (filing suit against a railroad "interrupted" the peremptive limitation against
that railroad's reorganization trustee); Wick v. Sellers, 309 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975) (the filing of suit against original defendants interrupted the "prescriptive
or peremptive period of Article 2315" as to defendants now alleged to be solidarily.
liable, 309 So. 2d at 913); Marshall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 204 So. 2d 665
(La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 La. 860, 206 So. 2d 711 (1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 883 (1960) (the pendency of suit in federal court "suspended the prescriptive or
peremptive period." 204 So. 2d at 667).
Smith v. Monroe Grocery Co., 171 So. 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937), is sometimes
cited for the proposition that a peremptive period can be interrupted. However, that
case dealt with an amending petition filed after the one year period averring the needed
allegation that decedent was not survived by wife or children. The court acknowledged
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emption cannot be interrupted or suspended." What these
cases have in common, however, is the fact that in each of them
the plaintiff had exercised, in some form, the right granted by
article 2315 within the one year limitation. 8
In McClendon, since the identity of the alleged murderer
was not discovered until two years after the crime, the right of
action was not exercised at all within the year after the murder.
Not even those cases which had said that peremption could be
"suspended" or "interrupted" had gone so far as to say that
something other than filing suit could "suspend" or
"interrupt" the running of the peremptive time period. However, prescription can be interrupted by the application of the
doctrine contra non valentem when the plaintiff is unable to
bring suit because his cause of action is concealed from him by
a tortfeasor." The First Circuit was thus compelled to decide
that peremption is "not subject to interruption as in the case of prescription, properly
speaking" but said the amendment would "not be the equivalent to the bringing of
new actions so as to render applicable the one-year peremptive period stipulated in
. . .art. 2315." 171 So. at 171.
27. The supreme court has recently re-affirmed that peremption "does not admit
of interruption or suspension." Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch, 364 So. 2d 928, 931 (La. 1978).
The scholarship dealing with peremption has also recognized this. E.g., "A period that
admits of suspension or interruption cannot properly be called a peremptive period."
Johnson, supra note 4, at 37 (emphasis removed); "[Tihere can be no interruption
by suit." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 TermPrescription, 29 LA. L. REv. 230, 231 (1969).
28. The courts have apparently not considered whether the notion that the exercise of the right operates to keep the right alive beyond the one year period (so that
another suit may be brought on the same cause of action after the period expires) is
consistent with the theory of peremption. See the authorities cited in note 27, supra,
which strongly suggest that it is not.
One theory attempting to square this apparent contradiction was presented in
Thompson v. Gallien, 127 F.2d 664, 665-66 (5th Cir. 1942). The Louisiana legislature
had provided "[t]hat the filing of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction shall
interrupt all prescriptions affecting the cause of action therein sued upon." 1932 La.
Acts, No. 39. The court reasoned that "peremption affects the cause of action and
prescription affects only the remedy." 127 F.2d at 666. Since the courts had long been
applying the principle of interruption by suit to prescription, the court reasoned that
"it may well be that the legislature intended ...
to apply the same principle of law
to peremptions . . . " 127 F.2d at 666.
29. See notes 26-28, supra, and accompanying text.
30. See note 3, supra. See also Aegis Ins. Co. v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 99 So. 2d
767 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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if the time limitation for wrongful death is prescriptive or peremptive.
Noting first that article 2315, the source of the survival
action and the wrongful death action, "contemplates two separate and distinct actions," 3' the court made reference to the
fact that the one year limitation is found in the sentence of the
article dealing with the survival action, while no mention of a
time limitation is made in the wrongful death portion of 2315.
The court observed "that it might be quite reasonable to provide different time limitations" for the two actions.32 The court
then interpreted the word "also" in the sentence "the survivors
in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the
damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of
the deceased" to mean only that these beneficiaries could bring
a wrongful death action in addition to the survival action. The
view expressed in an earlier case that the use of the word "also"
indicated that "the wrongful death action was based on the
same conditions as the survival action and was subject to the
same one year limitation" was rejected.3 3 Article 2315 was
deemed not to provide the limitation for wrongful death, so the
governing period was not peremptive; rather, the court held
that the prescriptive period of article 3536 was the applicable
a
time limit. 34
Though the holding in McClendon is clear, the opinion is
unsatisfying because it actually does little to alleviate the confusion surrounding the nature of the time limitation for a
wrongful death action. In fact, it may have added to the confusion by its rather loose treatment of the jurisprudence. Noting
the varying jurisprudential treatments of the time limitation,
31. McClendon v. State Dep't of Corrections, 359 So. 2d 1218, 1223 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978).
32. Id. at 1224. This was a response to the language in Matthews v. Kansas City
Southern Railway Co., 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (2d Cir. 1929), in which the court
had said that it would be unreasonable to suppose that the legislature intended otherwise.
33. 357 So. 2d at 1224 (emphasis added). Matthews v. Kansas City Southern
Railway Co., 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (2d Cir. 1929), had said that "also" meant
the two actions were based on the same conditions and subject to the same limitation.
10 La. App. at 385, 120 So. at 909.
34. 357 So. 2d at 1224.
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the court pointed to a line of cases which it said held the period
to be prescriptive.35 Yet, these cases36 are not very persuasive
authority for the proposition that the period is prescriptive
rather than peremptive. In each of the cited cases, the court
treated the period as prescriptive but found that the period had
not been interrupted. Even if the period had been considered
peremptive, the result in these cases would have been the same
because the one year period had run without the right being
exercised. Thus, in the cited cases the courts were not required
to choose between prescription or peremption, that issue not
being before them.
Moreover, the court in McClendon did not address the fact
that the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, when
forced to choose whether the period is peremptive in situations
where the distinction was material, has held the period to be
peremptive. 3 7 In the two cases where the court so held, a different disposition of the case would have followed had the period
been determined to be prescriptive.3 8 In both cases the holding
35. Id. at 1223.
36. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975); Stephenson v.
New Orleans R.R. & Light Co., 165 La. 132, 115 So. 412 (1928); Favors v. Southern
Indus., Inc., 344 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Sansone v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 164 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1st Cir), cert. denied, 246 La. 596, 165 So. 2d 486
(1964).
37. Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968); Kenney v. Trinidad
Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
38. In Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968), a diversity suit
arising out of an accident in Louisiana that was filed in Texas, the federal court was
bound to apply Texas conflict of law rules. Plaintiffs argued that "a Texas court would
look to the procedural rules of Texas in determining the application of a statute of
limitations." 400 F.2d at 673. Thus, a suit filed thirteen months after the death would
not have been barred because Texas had a two year statute of limitations, "generally
characterized as procedural." 420 F.2d at 673. However, the court found that Texas
courts had held " 'that where the statute creates a right and also incorporates a limitation upon the time . . . the limitation . . . becomes a part of the substantive law
rather than procedural.'" 400 F.2d at 673, quoting California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196,
309 S.W.2d 227, 231, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967 (1958). The court then found the
limitation to be given by the statute and thus to be peremptive, barring plaintiffs suit.
Had the court found the period to be prescriptive, the longer two year period given by
the Texas statute of limitations would have been applied, and plaintiff's claim would
not have been barred.
Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030
(1966), an action in admiralty for the wrongful death of a tugboat crew member
drowned in the Mississippi, was not filed for several years after the death. Libellants
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that the period was peremptive, a matter of substantive law,
precluded the application of the longer time periods being
urged by those bringing suit."
McClendon does, however, highlight a point not often discussed in the jurisprudence: the fact that the time limitation
in article 2315 is not found in the sentence granting the wrongful death action.40 The court could have further noted that the
statute which created the wrongful death action was passed in
1884,41 some twenty-nine years after the statute creating the
2
survival action which contained the one year limitation.
While recognizing that the statute which created the wrongful
death action also re-enacted the survival action, 3 it can be
argued that according to the oft-stated criterion for determining whether a period is peremptive, the wrongful death period
is not." The statute creating the action did not prescribe the
time limitation. The time limitation in 2315 was fixed by the
statute which had created the survival action in 1855. Thus,
this observation should be part of any argument that the period
is prescriptive.45
Another seldom discussed issue brought out by the court
is the dissimilar natures of the survival and wrongful death
actions. However, the court did not elaborate fully on the difclaimed that the maritime doctrine of laches excused the delay. The court, applying
the state wrongful death statute, said: "[P]rocedural matters are governed by federal
procedural law. . . . On the other hand, substantive matters which are integral parts
of the state created rights . . . must be governed by state law." 349 F.2d at 837. Thus,
in this case "the crucial point . . . is whether the time limit . . . is a matter of
substance or . . . procedure." 349 F.2d at 837. The court noted that Louisiana law
"distinguish[es] between a period . .. that is prescriptive and therefore procedural
and one that is peremptive . . . and therefore substantive." 349 F.2d at 837. The court
held the period to be peremptive and thus did not reach the question of excusable
laches. 349 F.2d at 838.
39. See note 38, supra. See also Dainow, supra note 27, at 230, wherein the
difference between prescription and peremption is explained. Prescription acts only as
a "bar" to the action, whereas peremption "absolutely extinguishe[s] the action."
40. See note 14, supra.
41. 1884 La. Acts, No. 71.
42. 1855 La. Acts, No. 223.
43. Id.
44. See note 16, supra, and accompanying text.
45. The First Circuit might have also noted that the supreme court has always
called the period prescriptive. See note 20, supra.
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ferences between the two actions. The survival action is in the
nature of a succession right; the plaintiffs' right to recovery is
not based on harm to them, but rather the victim's right to
recovery is transferred by operation of law to the plaintiffs.4 1 On
the other hand, the wrongful death action directly compensates
the person injured by the death of another and thus is a tort
action. Given that a wrongful death action is a tort action and
that the survival action is in the nature of a succession right,
it is not illogical for the two actions to be governed by different
types of time periods.
One major problem the court failed to address is that if the
time bar for the wrongful death action is prescriptive and the
time bar for the survival action is peremptive (as the court said
it is), then the two actions logically must constitute two separate causes of action.' But in 1931, in the celebrated case of
Reed v. Warren,8 the supreme court said that the two actions
were "founded upon the same cause of action."49 This proposi46. See King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. 1975). In France it has been
held that the action of the victim of a fatal accident dies with him and does not pass
to his heirs. 2 M. PLAINIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 389, at 221 n.1 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). The theory apparently is that allowing such a recovery would
be an unjust enrichment of the heirs. See Voss, supra note 5, at 216.
47. While the First Circuit did not explicitly say that the actions were two separate causes of action, the court noted that article 2315 "contemplates two separate and
distinct actions." 357 So. 2d at 1223.
48. 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931).
49. 172 La. at 1093, 136 So. at 63. But see Johnson, supra note 4, at 9, where it
is contended that no such proposition was advanced. Professor Johnson asserts that
the language saying there is "only one cause of action" refers only to the wrongful death
claims of the multiple beneficiaries. Yet there is a reference in Reed two sentences
earlier than the one quoted by Professor Johnson where the court said that the fact
that Mrs. Reed's children could claim different amounts for damages resulting from
wrongful death "is no reason why the defendant should be subjected to the annoyance
and expense of defending five, or perhaps ten, lawsuits, allfounded upon the same
cause of action." 172 La. at 1092, 136 So. at 63 (emphasis added). The reference to
ten lawsuits apparently is a reference to the fact that the five children of Mrs. Reed
had each filed a separate suit. If the actions had been considered distinct, it might have
have been argued that the survivors each had the right to bring a suit under the
wrongful death action and a suit under the survival action.
Of course the statements in Reed about wrongful death and survival constituting
one cause of action are dicta. As the court phrased the issue:
The question in this case is whether several persons having a right of action
for damages against one who inflicted personal injuries causing the death of
another must be made parties to one suit for damages, or may bring as many
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tion has not gone without criticism, 50 and it has been contended
that the rule has not been followed when the issue had any real
importance.5 1 However, the rule has not been clearly overturned;51 therefore, the First Circuit was remiss in not addresssuits as there are persons entitled to the right of action.
172 La. at 1084, 136 So. at 60. In this case Mrs. Reed's five children had brought five
separate suits claiming both the survival action and the wrongful death action. 172 La.
at 1084, 136 So. at 60. Thus, the question of whether wrongful death and survival
actions might be brought in separate actions was not before the court. This question
did arise in Norton v. Crescent City Ice Manufacturing Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855
(1933), and the court reiterated the one cause of action theory, holding that the two
actions must be brought in the same suit. Whether the language in Reed that was
adopted by the court in Norton regarding one cause of action is part of the ratio
decidendi of any holding that the two actions must be brought in the same suit, or
whether it is dicta that is not essential to any such holding, is arguable. In saying that
the two actions must be brought in the same suit, the court in Reed seems to have
been responding more to what it deemed to be the legislative intent than to anything
inherent in the two actions that would preclude their being brought in separate suits.
"We do not believe that the Legislature intended, by the act of 1884, to give to a
survivor . . . the right to bring two suits . . . ." 172 La. at 1089, 136 So. at 61-62. It
was only after the court had determined this, that it said that there is just one cause
of action. 172 La. at 1092, 136 So. at 62. Cf. Theis, Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.:
The Non-AggregationRule in JurisdictionalAmount Cases, 35 LA. L. REv. 88, 105 n.88
(1974) (where it is stated that the holding in Reed that the defendant is entitled to
have all the defendants joined in one suit "is based, at least in part, on considerations
of convenience to the defendant, not the nature of the interest asserted by the plaintiffs"). See Johnson, supra note 4, at 8, where it is asserted that these same convenience factors played a part in the court's determination that the two claims cannot
be brought in separate actions.
50. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 12-13.
51. Johnson, supra note 4, at 10. It should be noted that the cases cited by
Professor Johnson are either lower court opinions or pre.Reed v. Warren. Especially
noteworthy, however, is a First Circuit opinion which holds that a compromise of the
survival action did not bar a wrongful death action. Johnson v. Sundberry, 150 So. 299
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1933). As Professor Johnson says, "surely this is not consistent with
a one-cause-of-action theory." Johnson, supra note 4, at 10.
52. In its original opinion in Callais v. Allstate Insurance Co., 334 So. 2d 692,
695 (La. 1976), the court did repudiate the one-cause-of-action theory, but on rehearing
it modified its stance, saying that there are "two types of death actions" provided by
article 2315. 334 So. 2d at 700.
See also King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975), where Justice Barham took
note of the fact that in France (from which our article 2315 originally came) it is
recognized that "[tihe legal right and cause of action of one injured by loss of economic aid or love and affection was independent of any action which the deceased
might have had and.which would have passed to the heirs upon his death." 316 So.
2d at 369. The court went on to say that "Hubgh was in error." 316 So. 2d at 369. The
inference might be drawn that the one-cause-of-action theory is also in error because
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ing the issue. If there is only one cause of action, it logically
follows that the time period for the wrongful death and survival
actions must be the same. The court ignored the issue; consequently, the opinion loses credibility.
The opinion in McClendon is a significant break with the
jurisprudence, which had never held that the period was prescriptive rather than peremptive.13 Had the court treated the
period as peremptive, a "strange principle" of law would have
resulted-recovery would be denied when death ensues, yet
recovery would be allowed when injury short of death results.54
The holding that the period is prescriptive (and thus interruptible by the doctrine of contra non valentem) seems more
compatible with contemporary notions of justice than a holding that plaintiffs claim had perempted. But the First Circuit
failed to articulate Clearly why the period is prescriptive rather
than peremptive. Its inadequate treatment of both the statutes
and the jurisprudence" merely adds to the confusion surrounding the issue. Nor is the court's reasoning as to why the period
should be viewed as prescriptive rather than peremptive as
persuasive as it could have been." Perhaps the confusion can
only be ended by legislative action57 or by a clear statement by
the supreme court on the nature of the time bar to the wrongful
the wrongful death action is described as an "independent action" given by the legislature in 1884 when the Hubgh error was corrected. 316 So. 2d at 369.
Also, in the original opinion in Callais the supreme court rejected the argument
that article 2315's language gives the right of action for the wrongful death action only
to those "in whose favor (the right to bring a survival) action survives." 334 So. 2d at
695. See note 14, supra.
53. But see Johnson, supra note 4, at 41, where it is asserted that
"jurisprudential treatment of the period, whatever it is called, differs not at all from
the treatment of a prescriptive period." However, this is true only in cases dealing with
the "interruption" of peremption by filing suit. See notes 26-28, supra, and accompanying text. In other contexts the jurisprudential treatment of the period has differed
depending on whether the period was considered to be one or the other. See notes 3739, supra, and accompanying text. In the instant case, of course, the difference between
peremption and prescription made the difference between plaintiff being heard on the
merits or not.
54. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 611 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting), where the application of the principle in an admiralty case yielded such a result.
55. See text at notes 35-39, supra.
56. See text at notes 40-46, supra.
57. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 54-58.
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death action. Short of either of these, opinions such as
McClendon will only produce further problems.
Gerald J. Talbot

